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Abstract
Current reading comprehension models gener-
alise well to in-distribution test sets, yet per-
form poorly on adversarially selected inputs.
Most prior work on adversarial inputs stud-
ies oversensitivity: semantically invariant text
perturbations that cause a model’s prediction
to change when it should not. In this work we
focus on the complementary problem: exces-
sive prediction undersensitivity, where input
text is meaningfully changed but the model’s
prediction does not, even though it should.
We formulate a noisy adversarial attack which
searches among semantic variations of the
question for which a model erroneously pre-
dicts the same answer, and with even higher
probability. Despite comprising unanswerable
questions, both SQuAD2.0 and NewsQA mod-
els are vulnerable to this attack. This indicates
that although accurate, models tend to rely on
spurious patterns and do not fully consider the
information specified in a question. We ex-
periment with data augmentation and adver-
sarial training as defences, and find that both
substantially decrease vulnerability to attacks
on held out data, as well as held out attack
spaces. Addressing undersensitivity also im-
proves results on ADDSENT and ADDONE-
SENT, and models furthermore generalise bet-
ter when facing train/evaluation distribution
mismatch: they are less prone to overly rely
on predictive cues present only in the training
set, and outperform a conventional model by
as much as 10.9% F1.
1 Introduction
Neural networks can be vulnerable to adversar-
ial input perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2013; Ku-
rakin et al., 2016). In Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP), which operates on discrete sym-
bol sequences, adversarial attacks can take a vari-
ety of forms (Ettinger et al., 2017; Alzantot et al.,
2018) including character perturbations (Ebrahimi
et al., 2018), semantically invariant reformula-
tions (Ribeiro et al., 2018b; Iyyer et al., 2018a)
or – specifically in Reading Comprehension (RC)
– adversarial text insertions (Jia and Liang, 2017;
Wang and Bansal, 2018). A model’s inabil-
ity to handle adversarially chosen input text puts
into perspective otherwise impressive generalisa-
tion results for in-distribution test sets (Seo et al.
(2017); Yu et al. (2018); Devlin et al. (2019); inter
alia) and constitutes an important caveat to con-
clusions drawn regarding a model’s language un-
derstanding abilities.
While semantically invariant text transforma-
tions can remarkably alter a model’s predictions,
the converse problem of model undersensitivity is
equally troublesome: a model’s text input can of-
ten be drastically changed in meaning while re-
taining the original prediction. In particular, pre-
vious works (Feng et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al.,
2018a; Welbl et al., 2020) show that even after
deletion of all but a small fraction of input words,
models often produce the same output. How-
ever, such reduced inputs are usually unnatural to
a human reader, and it is both unclear what be-
haviour we should expect from natural language
models evaluated on unnatural text, and how to
use such unnatural inputs to improve models. In
this work we show that, in RC, undersensitivity
can be probed with automatically generated natu-
ral language questions. In turn, we use these to
both make RC models more sensitive when they
should be, and more robust in the presence of bi-
ased training data.
Figure 1 shows an example for a BERT
LARGE model (Devlin et al., 2019) trained on
SQuAD2.0 (Rajpurkar et al., 2018) that is given
a text and a comprehension question, i.e. What
was Fort Caroline renamed to after the Spanish
attack? which it correctly answers as San Mateo
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F. Caroline → R.Oppenheimer Spanish → Hungarian
F.Caroline → Fort Knox Given Text: The nearby Spanish settlement of St. 
Augustine attacked Fort 
Caroline, and killed nearly all 
the French soldiers defending 
it. The Spanish renamed the 
fort San Mateo […]
q
q0
qadv
Adversarial Example (         ):
What was Robert Oppenheimer renamed to after the Spanish attack?  San Mateo (0.99)
qadv
Original Example (   ):
What was Fort Caroline renamed to after the Spanish attack?  San Mateo (0.98)
q
Figure 1: Method Overview: Adversarial search over semantic variations of RC questions, producing unanswerable
questions for which the model retains its predictions with even higher probability.
with 98% confidence. Altering this question, how-
ever, can increase model confidence for this same
prediction to 99%, even though the new question
is unanswerable given the same context. That is,
we observe an increase in model confidence, de-
spite removing relevant question information and
replacing it with irrelevant content.
We formalise the process of finding such ques-
tions as an adversarial search in a discrete input
space arising from perturbations of the original
question. There are two types of discrete per-
turbations we consider, based on part-of-speech
and named entities, with the aim of obtaining
grammatical and semantically consistent alterna-
tive questions that do not accidentally have the
same correct answer. We find that SQuAD2.0
and NewsQA (Trischler et al., 2017) models can
be attacked on a substantial proportion of sam-
ples, even with a limited computational adversar-
ial search budget.
The observed undersensitivity correlates neg-
atively with in-distribution test set performance
metrics (EM/F1), suggesting that this phenomenon
– where present – is a reflection of a model’s lack
of question comprehension. When training mod-
els to defend against undersensitivity attacks with
data augmentation and adversarial training, we ob-
serve that they can generalise their robustness to
held out evaluation data without sacrificing in-
distribution test set performance. Furthermore, the
models improve on the adversarial datasets pro-
posed by Jia and Liang (2017), and behave more
robustly in a learning scenario that has dataset bias
with a train/evaluation distribution mismatch, in-
creasing performance by up to 10.9%F1. In sum-
mary, our contributions are as follows:
• We propose a new type of adversarial attack
targeting the undersensitivity of neural RC
models, and show that current models are
vulnerable to it.
• We compare two defence strategies, data aug-
mentation and adversarial training, and show
their effectiveness at reducing undersensitiv-
ity errors on held-out data and held-out per-
turbations, without sacrificing in-distribution
test set performance.
• We demonstrate that the resulting mod-
els generalise better on ADDSENT and
ADDONESENT (Jia and Liang, 2017), as
well as in a biased data scenario, improving
their ability to answer questions with many
possible answers when trained on questions
with only one.
2 Related Work
Adversarial Attacks in NLP Adversarial ex-
amples have been studied extensively in NLP –
see Zhang et al. (2019) for a recent survey. How-
ever, automatically generating adversarial exam-
ples in NLP is non-trivial, as the search space
is discrete and altering a single word can easily
change the semantics of an instance or render it
incoherent. Recent work overcomes this issue by
focusing on simple semantic-invariant transforma-
tions, showing that neural models can be oversen-
sitive to such modifications of the inputs. For in-
stance, Ribeiro et al. (2018b) use a set of sim-
ple perturbations such as replacing Who is with
Who’s. Other semantics-preserving perturbations
include typos (Hosseini et al., 2017), the addi-
tion of distracting sentences (Jia and Liang, 2017;
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Wang and Bansal, 2018), character-level adversar-
ial perturbations (Ebrahimi et al., 2018), and para-
phrasing (Iyyer et al., 2018b).
In this work, we instead focus on undersen-
sitivity of neural RC models to semantic pertur-
bations of the input. This is related to previ-
ous works leveraging domain knowledge for the
generation of adversarial examples (Kang et al.,
2018; Minervini and Riedel, 2018): our method
is based on the idea that modifying, for instance,
the named entities involved in a question can com-
pletely change its meaning and, as a consequence,
the answer to the question should also differ. Our
approach does not assume white-box access to the
model, as do e.g. Ebrahimi et al. (2018) and Wal-
lace et al. (2019).
Undersensitivity Jacobsen et al. (2019) demon-
strated classifier undersensitivity in computer vi-
sion, where altered input images can still produce
the same prediction scores, achieved using (ap-
proximately) invertible networks. Niu and Bansal
(2018) investigated over- and undersensitivity in
dialogue models and addressed the problem with
a max-margin training approach. Ribeiro et al.
(2018a) describe a general model diagnosis tool
to identify minimal feature sets that are suffi-
cient for a model to form high-confidence predic-
tions. Feng et al. (2018) showed that it is pos-
sible to reduce inputs to minimal input word se-
quences without changing a model’s predictions.
Welbl et al. (2020) investigated formal verification
against undersensitivity to text deletions.
We see our work as a continuation of this line of
inquiry, but with a particular focus on undersensi-
tivity in RC. In contrast to prior work (Feng et al.,
2018; Welbl et al., 2020), we consider concrete al-
ternative questions, rather than arbitrarily reduced
input word sequences. We furthermore address the
observed undersensitivity using dedicated training
objectives, in contrast to Feng et al. (2018) and
Ribeiro et al. (2018a) who simply highlight it.
Finally, one of the baseline methods we later
test for defending against undersensitivity attacks
is a form of data augmentation that has similarly
been used for de-biasing NLP models (Zhao et al.,
2018; Lu et al., 2018).
Unanswerable Questions in Reading Compre-
hension Following Jia and Liang (2017)’s pub-
lication of adversarial attacks on the SQuAD1.1
dataset, Rajpurkar et al. (2018) proposed the
SQuAD2.0 dataset, which includes over 43,000
human-curated unanswerable questions. A
second dataset with unanswerable question is
NewsQA (Trischler et al., 2017), comprising ques-
tions about news texts. Training on these datasets
should conceivably result in models with an ability
to tell whether questions are answerable or not; we
will see, however, that this does not extend to ad-
versarially chosen unanswerable questions in our
undersensitivity attacks. Hu et al. (2019) address
unanswerability of questions from a given text us-
ing additional verification steps. Other approaches
have shown the benefit of synthetic data to im-
prove performance in SQuAD2.0 (Zhu et al., 2019;
Alberti et al., 2019).
We operate on the same underlying research
premise, that the ability to handle unanswerable
questions is an important part of improving text
comprehension models. In contrast to prior work,
we demonstrate that despite improving perfor-
mance on test sets that include unanswerable ques-
tions, the problem persists when adversarially
choosing from a larger space of questions.
3 Methodology
Problem Overview Consider a discriminative
model fθ, parameterised by a collection of vectors
θ, which transforms an input x into a prediction
yˆ = fθ(x). In our task, x = (t, q) is a given text t
paired with a question q about this text. The label
y is the answer to q where it exists, or a NoAnswer
label where it cannot be answered.1
In a text comprehension setting the set of possi-
ble answers is large, and predictions yˆ should be
dependent on x. And indeed, randomly choos-
ing a different input (t′, q′) is usually associated
with a change of the model prediction yˆ. However,
there exist many examples where the prediction
erroneously remains stable; the goal of the attack
formulated here is to find such cases. Concretely,
given a computational search budget, the goal is to
discover inputs x′, for which the model still erro-
neously predicts fθ(x′) = fθ(x), even though x′
is not answerable from the text.
Input Perturbation Spaces Identifying suitable
candidates for x′ can be achieved in manifold
ways. One approach is to search among a large
question collection, but we find this to only rarely
be successful; an example is shown in Table 8,
1Unanswerable questions are part of, e.g. the SQuAD2.0
and NewsQA datasets, but not of SQuAD1.1.
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Appendix C. Generating x′, on the other hand,
is prone to result in ungrammatical or otherwise
ill-formed text. Instead, we consider a perturba-
tion space XT (x) spanned by perturbing original
inputs x using a perturbation function family T :
XT (x) = {Ti(x) | Ti ∈ T } (1)
This space XT (x) contains alternative model in-
puts derived from x. Ideally the transformation
function family T is chosen such that the cor-
rect label of these new inputs is changed: for
x′ ∈ XT (x) : y(x′) 6= y(x). We will later search
within XT (x) to find inputs x′ which erroneously
retain the same prediction as x: yˆ(x) = yˆ(x′).
Part-of-Speech (PoS) Perturbations We first
consider the perturbation space XTP (x) generated
by PoS perturbations TP of the original ques-
tion: we swap individual tokens with other, PoS-
consistent alternative tokens, where we draw from
large collections of tokens of the same PoS types.
For example, we might alter the question Who pa-
tronized the monks in Italy? to Who betrayed the
monks in Italy? by replacing the past tense verb
patronized with betrayed. There is however no
guarantee that the altered question will require a
different answer (e.g. due to synonyms). Even
more so – there might be type clashes or other se-
mantic inconsistencies (e.g. Who built the monks
in Italy?). We perform a qualitative analysis to in-
vestigate the extent of this problem and find that,
while a valid concern, for the majority of attack-
able samples there exist attacks based on correct
well-formed questions (see Section 5).
Named Entity Perturbations The space
XTE (x) generated by the transformation family
TE is created by substituting mentions of named
entities (NE) in the question with different type-
consistent NE, derived from a large collection
E. For example, a comprehension question Who
patronized the monks in Italy? could be altered
to Who patronized the monks in Las Vegas?,
replacing the geopolitical entity Italy with Las
Vegas, chosen from E. Altering NE often changes
the specifics of the question and poses different
requirements to the answer, which are unlikely to
be satisfied from what is stated in the given text,
given the broad nature of entities in E. While
perturbed questions are not guaranteed to be
unanswerable or require a different answer, we
will later find in a qualitative analysis that for the
large majority of cases they do.
Undersensitivity Attacks Thus far we have de-
scribed different methods of perturbing questions.
We will search in the resulting perturbation spaces
XTP (x) and XTE (x) for inputs x′ for which the
model prediction remains constant. However, we
pose a slightly stronger requirement: fθ should as-
sign an even higher probability to the same predic-
tion yˆ(x) = yˆ(x′) than for the original input:
P (yˆ | x′) > P (yˆ | x) (2)
This defines a sufficient criterion for preserving
the prediction. It is a conservative choice, as it
includes only the subset of prediction-preserving
cases with increased model probability.
To summarise, we are searching in a perturba-
tion space for altered questions which result in a
higher model probability to the same answer as
the original input question. If we have found an
altered question that satisfies inequality (2), then
we have identified a successful attack, which we
will refer to as an undersensitivity attack.
Adversarial Search in Perturbation Space In
its simplest form, a search for an adversarial attack
in the previously defined attack spaces amounts
to a search over a list of single lexical alterations
for the maximum (or any) higher prediction prob-
ability. We can however repeat the replacement
procedure multiple times, arriving at texts with
potentially larger lexical distance to the original
question. For example, in two iterations of PoS-
consistent lexical replacement, we can alter Who
was the duke in the battle of Hastings? to inputs
like Who was the duke in the expedition of Roger?
The space of possibilities with increasing dis-
tance grows combinatorially, and with increasing
perturbation radius it becomes computationally in-
feasible to comprehensively cover the full pertur-
bation spaces arising from iterated substitutions.
To address this, we follow Feng et al. (2018) and
apply beam search to narrow the search space, and
seek to maximise the difference
∆ = P (yˆ | x′)− P (yˆ | x) (3)
Beam search is conducted up to a pre-specified
maximum perturbation radius ρ, but once x′ with
∆ > 0 has been found, we stop the search.
Relation to Attacks in Prior Work Note that
this type of attack stands in contrast to other at-
tacks based on small, semantically invariant input
perturbations (Belinkov and Bisk, 2018; Ebrahimi
4
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(b) Named Entity perturbations
Figure 2: BERT LARGE on SQuAD2.0: vulnerability to noisy attacks on held out data for differently sized attack
spaces (parameter η) and different beam search depth (perturbation radius ρ).
et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al., 2018b) which in-
vestigate oversensitivity problems. Such seman-
tic invariance comes with stronger requirements
and relies on synonym dictionaries (Ebrahimi
et al., 2018) or paraphrases harvested from back-
translation (Iyyer et al., 2018a), which are both in-
complete and noisy. Our attack is instead focused
on undersensitivity, i.e. where the model is stable
in its prediction even though it should not be. Con-
sequently the requirements are not as difficult to
fulfil when defining perturbation spaces that alter
the question meaning, and one can rely on sets of
entities and PoS examples automatically extracted
from a large text collection.
In contrast to prior attacks (Ebrahimi et al.,
2018; Wallace et al., 2019), we evaluate each per-
turbed input with a standard forward pass rather
than using a first-order Taylor approximation to
estimate the output change induced by a change
in input. This is less efficient but exact, and fur-
thermore does not require white-box access to the
model and its parameters.
4 Experiments: Model Vulnerability
Training and Dataset Details We next conduct
experiments using the attacks laid out above to in-
vestigate model undersensitivity. We attack the
BERT model (Devlin et al., 2019) fine-tuned on
SQuAD2.0 (Rajpurkar et al., 2018), and measure
to what extent the model exhibits undersensitivity
when adversarially choosing input perturbations.
Our choice of BERT is motivated by its currently
widespread adoption across the NLP field, and
empirical success across a wide range of datasets.
Note that SQuAD2.0 per design contains unan-
swerable questions in both training and evaluation
sets; models are thus trained to predict a NoAn-
swer option where a comprehension question can-
not be answered.
In a preliminary pilot experiment, we first train
a BERT LARGE model on the full training set
for 2 epochs, where it reaches 78.32%EM and
81.44%F1, in close range to results (78.7%EM and
81.9%F1) reported by Devlin et al. (2019). We
then however choose a different training setup as
we would like to conduct adversarial attacks on
data inaccessible during training: we split off 5%
from the original training set for development pur-
poses and retain the remaining 95% for training,
stratified by articles. We use this development data
to tune hyperparameters and perform early stop-
ping, evaluated every 5,000 steps with batch size
16 and patience 5, and will later tune hyperparam-
eters for defence on it. The original SQuAD2.0
development set is then used as evaluation data,
where the model reaches 73.0%EM and 76.5%F1;
we will compute the undersensitivity attacks on
this entirely held out part of the dataset.
Attack Details To compute the perturbation
spaces, we collect large sets of string expressions
across Named Entity (NE) and PoS types to de-
fine the perturbation spaces TE and TP , which we
gather from the Wikipedia paragraphs used in the
SQuAD2.0 training set, with the pretrained tag-
gers in spaCy,2 and the Penn Treebank tag set for
PoS. This results on average in 5,126 different en-
tities per entity type, and 2,337 different tokens per
PoS tag. When computing PoS perturbations, we
found it useful to disregard perturbations of partic-
ular PoS types that often led to only minor changes
2https://spacy.io
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Original / Modified Question Prediction Annotation Scores
What city in Victoria is called the cricket ground of Melbourne valid 0.63 / 0.75
Australia the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited ?
What are some of the accepted general principles of fundamental valid 0.59 / 0.61
European Union Al-Andalus law? rights [...]
What were the annual every year carriage fees for £30m same answer 0.95 / 0.97
the channels?
What percentage of Victorians are Christian Girlish ? 61.1% valid 0.92 / 0.93
Which plateau is the left part achievement of Warsaw on? moraine semantic 0.52 / 0.58
inconsistency
Who leads the Student commissioning Government? an Executive same answer 0.61 / 0.65
Committee
Table 1: Example adversarial questions ( original , attack ), together with their annotation as either a valid coun-
terexample or other type. Top 3: Named Entity perturbations. Bottom 3: PoS perturbations.
or incorrectly formed expressions, such as punctu-
ation or determiners; more details on the left out
tags can be found in Appendix A. As the number
of possible perturbations to consider is potentially
very large, we limit beam search at each step to
a maximum of η randomly chosen type-consistent
entities from E, or tokens from P , and re-sample
these throughout the search. We use a beam width
of b = 5, resulting in a bound to the total compu-
tation spent on adversarial search of b · ρ · η model
evaluations per sample, where ρ is the perturbation
“radius” (the maximum search depth).
Metric: Adversarial Error Rate We quantify
adversarial vulnerability to the described attacks
by measuring the proportion of evaluation samples
for which at least one undersensitivity attack is
found given a computational search budget, disre-
garding cases where a model predicts NoAnswer.3
4.1 Results
Figure 2 shows plots for adversarial error rates
on SQuAD2.0 for both perturbation types across
various search budgets. We observe that attacks
based on PoS perturbations can already for very
small search budgets (η = 32, ρ = 1) reach more
than 60% attack success rates, and this number
can be raised to 95% with a larger computational
budget. For perturbations based on Named Entity
substitution, we find overall lower attack success
3Altering unanswerable samples likely retains their unan-
swerability.
rates, but still find that more than half of the sam-
ples can successfully be attacked under the bud-
gets tested. Note that where attacks were found,
we observed that there often exist multiple alter-
natives with higher probability.
These findings demonstrate that BERT is not
necessarily considering the entire contents of a
comprehension question given to it, and that even
though trained to tell when questions are unan-
swerable, the model often fails when facing ad-
versarially selected unanswerable questions.
In a side experiment we also investigated un-
dersensitivity attacks using Named Entity pertur-
bations on SQuAD1.1, which proves even more
vulnerable with an adversarial error rate of 70%
already using a budget of η = 32; ρ = 1 (com-
pared to 34% on SQuAD2.0). While this demon-
strates that undersensitivity is also an issue for
SQuAD1.1, the unanswerable question behaviour
is not really well-defined, rendering results hard to
interpret. On the other hand, the notable drop be-
tween the datasets demonstrates the effectiveness
of the unanswerable questions added during train-
ing in SQuAD2.0.
5 Analysis and Characteristics of
Vulnerable Samples
Qualitative Analysis of Attacks As pointed out
before, the attacks are potentially noisy as the in-
troduced substitutions are by no means guaranteed
to result in meaningful and semantically consistent
6
PoS NE
Valid attack 51% 84%
Syntax error 10% 6%
Semantically incoherent 24% 5%
Same answer 15% 5%
Table 2: Analysis of undersensitivity attack samples for
both PoS and named entity (NE) perturbations.
Figure 3: Named entity type characteristics of attack-
able vs. unattackable samples.
expressions, or require a different answer than the
original. To gauge the extent of this we inspect
100 successful attacks conducted at ρ = 6 and
η = 256 on SQuAD2.0, both for PoS perturbations
and NE perturbations. We label them as either:
1. Having a syntax error (e.g. What would plat-
form lower if there were fewer people?).
These are mostly due to cascading errors
stemming from incorrect NE/PoS tag predic-
tions.
2. Semantically incoherent (e.g. Who built the
monks?).
3. Questions that require the same correct an-
swer as the original, e.g. due to a paraphrase.
4. Valid attacks: Questions that would either
demand a different answer or are unanswer-
able given the text (e.g. When did the United
States withdraw from the Bretton Woods Ac-
cord? and its perturbed version When did
Tuvalu withdraw from the Bretton Woods Ac-
cord?).
Table 1 shows several example attacks along
with their annotations, and in Table 2 the respec-
tive proportions are summarised. We observe that
a non-negligible portion of questions has some
form of syntax error or incoherent semantics, es-
pecially for PoS perturbations. Questions with the
identical correct answer are comparatively rare.
Finally, about half (51%) of all attacks in PoS, as
well as 84% for named entities are valid questions
that should either have a different answer, or the
Unanswerable label.
Overall the named entity perturbations result
in much cleaner questions than PoS perturba-
tions, which suffer from semantic inconsistencies
in about a quarter of the cases. While these ques-
tions have some sort of inconsistency (e.g. What
year did the case go before the supreme court?
vs. a perturbed version What scorer did the case
go before the supreme court?), it is remarkable
that the model assigns higher probabilities to the
original answer even when faced with incoherent
questions, casting doubt on the extent to which the
replaced question information is used to determine
the answer.
Since the NE-based attacks have a substan-
tially larger fraction of valid, well-posed alterna-
tive questions, we will focus our study on these
attacks for the remainder of this paper.
5.1 Characterising Successfully Attacked
Samples
We have observed that models are vulnerable to
undersensitivity adversaries, however not all sam-
ples are successfully attacked. This raises ques-
tions regarding what distinguishes samples that
can and cannot be attacked. We investigate var-
ious characteristics, aiming to understand model
vulnerability causes.
Questions that can be attacked produce lower
original prediction probabilities, with an average
of 72.9% compared to 83.8% for unattackable
questions. That is, there exists a direct inverse link
between a model’s original prediction probability
and sample vulnerability to an undersensitivity at-
tack. The adversarially chosen questions had an
average probability of 78.2%, i.e. a notable gap
to the original questions. It is worth noting that
search halted once a single question with higher
probability was found; continuing the search in-
creases the respective probabilities.
Vulnerable samples are furthermore less likely
to be given the correct prediction overall. Con-
cretely, evaluation metrics for vulnerable ex-
amples are 56.4%/69.6% EM/F1, compared to
73.0%/76.5% on the whole dataset (-16.6% and
-6.9% EM/F1).
Attackable questions have on average 12.3
7
tokens, whereas unattackable ones are slightly
shorter with on average 11.1 tokens. We consid-
ered the distribution of different question types
(What, Who, When, ...) for both attackable and
unattackable samples and did not observe no-
table differences apart from the single most fre-
quent question type What; it is a lot more preva-
lent among the unattacked questions (56.4%) than
among successfully attacked questions (42.1%).
This is by far the most common question type, and
furthermore one that is comparatively open-ended
and does not prescribe particular type expectations
to its answer, as e.g., a Where question would re-
quire a location. A possible explanation for the
prevalence of the What questions among unsuc-
cessfully attacked samples is thus, that the model
cannot rely on type constraints alone to arrive at
its predictions (Sugawara et al., 2018), and is thus
less prone to such exploitation. Section 6.2 will
study this in more detail.
Finally, Figure 3 shows a histogram of the 10
most common NE tags appearing in unsuccess-
fully attacked samples versus the corresponding
fraction of replaced entities in successfully at-
tacked samples. Besides one exception, the distri-
butions are remarkably similar. Undersensitivity
can be induced for a variety of entity types used in
the perturbation, but in particular questions with
geopolitical entities (GPE) are error-prone. A pos-
sible explanation can be provided by observations
regarding (non-contextualised) word embeddings,
which cluster geopolitical entities (e.g. countries)
close to one another, thus making them potentially
hard to distinguish for a model operating on these
embeddings (Mikolov et al., 2013).
6 Defending Against Undersensitivity
Attacks
We will now investigate methods for mitigating
excessive model undersensitivity. Prior work has
considered both data augmentation and adversar-
ial training for more robust models, and we will
conduct experiments with both. Adding a robust-
ness objective can negatively impact standard test
metrics (Tsipras et al., 2019), and it should be
noted that there exists a natural trade-off between
performance on one particular test set and perfor-
mance on a dataset of adversarial inputs. We per-
form data augmentation and adversarial training
by adding a corresponding loss term to the stan-
dard log-likelihood training objective:
LTotal = Lllh(Ω) + λ · Lllh(Ω′) (4)
where Ω is the standard training data, fit with a
discriminative log-likelihood objective, Ω′ either
a set of augmentation data points, or of success-
ful adversarial attacks where they exist, and λ > 0
a hyperparameter. In data augmentation, we ran-
domly sample perturbed input questions, whereas
in adversarial training we perform an adversarial
search to identify them. In both cases, alternative
data points in Ω′ will be fit to a NULL label to
represent the NoAnswer prediction – again using
a log-likelihood objective. Note that we continu-
ously update Ω′ throughout training to reflect ad-
versarial samples w.r.t. the current model.
Experimental Setup: SQuAD2.0 We train the
BERT LARGE model on SQuAD2.0, tuning
the hyperparameter λ ∈ {0.0, 0.01, 0.1, 0.25,
0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 2.0}, and find λ = 0.25 to work best
for both of the two defence strategies. We tune the
threshold for predicting NoAnswer based on vali-
dation data and report results on the test set (the
original SQuAD2.0 Dev set). All experiments are
executed with batch size 16, NE perturbations are
used for the defence methods, and adversarial at-
tacks with η = 32 and ρ = 1 in adversarial train-
ing. Where no attack is found for a given question
sampled during SGD training, we instead consider
a different sample from the original training data.
We evaluate the model on its validation data ev-
ery 5,000 steps and perform early stopping with a
patience of 5.
Experimental Setup: NewsQA Following the
experimental protocol for SQuAD, we further test
a BERT BASE model on NewsQA (Trischler et al.,
2017), which – like SQuAD2.0 – contains unan-
swerable questions. As annotators do often not
fully agree on their annotation in NewsQA, we
opt for a conservative choice and filter the dataset,
such that only samples with the same majority an-
notation are retained, following the preprocessing
pipeline of Talmor and Berant (2019).
Experimental Outcomes Results for these ex-
periments can be found in Table 3 and Table 4
for the two datasets, respectively. First, we ob-
serve that both data augmentation and adversarial
training substantially reduce the number of under-
sensitivity errors the model commits, consistently
across adversarial search budgets, and consistently
8
SQuAD2.0 Undersensitivity Error Rate HasAns NoAns Overall
Adv. budget η @32 @64 @128 @256 EM F1 EM/F1 EM F1
BERT LARGE 44.0 50.3 52.7 54.7 70.1 77.1 76.0 73.0 76.5
+ Data Augment. 4.5 9.1 11.9 18.9 66.1 72.2 80.7 73.4 76.5
+ Adv. Training 11.0 15.9 22.8 28.3 69.0 76.4 77.1 73.0 76.7
Table 3: Breakdown of undersensitivity error rate overall (lower is better), and standard performance metrics (EM,
F1; higher is better) on different subsets of SQuAD2.0 evaluation data, all in [%].
NewsQA Undersensitivity Error Rate HasAns NoAns Overall
Adv. budget η @32 @64 @128 @256 EM F1 EM/F1 EM F1
BERT BASE 34.2 34.7 36.4 37.3 41.6 53.1 61.6 45.7 54.8
+ Data Augment. 7.1 11.6 17.5 20.8 41.5 53.6 62.1 45.8 55.3
+ Adv. Training 20.1 24.1 26.9 29.1 39.0 50.4 67.1 44.8 53.9
Table 4: Breakdown of undersensitivity error rate overall (lower is better), and standard performance metrics (EM,
F1; higher is better) on different subsets of NewsQA evaluation data, all in [%].
across the two datasets. This demonstrates that
both training methods are effective defences and
can mitigate – but not eliminate – the model’s
undersensitivity problem. Notably the improved
robustness – especially for data augmentation –
is possible without sacrificing performance in the
overall standard metrics EM and F1, even slight
improvements are possible.
Second, data augmentation is a more effective
defence training strategy than adversarial training.
This holds true both in terms of standard and ad-
versarial metrics, and hints potentially at some ad-
versarial overfitting on the training set.
Finally, a closer inspection of how performance
changes on answerable (HasAns) vs. unanswer-
able (NoAns) samples of the datasets reveals that
models with modified training objectives show
improved performance on unanswerable samples,
while sacrificing some performance on answer-
able samples.4 This suggests that the trained mod-
els – even though similar in standard metrics –
evolve on different paths during training, and the
modified objectives prioritise fitting unanswerable
questions to a higher degree.
6.1 Evaluation on Held-Out Perturbation
Spaces
In Tables 3 and 4 results are computed using the
same perturbation spaces also used during train-
ing. These perturbation spaces are relatively large,
4Note that the NoAns prediction threshold is fine-tuned on
the respective validation sets.
and questions are about a disjoint set of articles
at evaluation time. Nevertheless there is the po-
tential of overfitting to the particular perturbations
used during training. To measure the extent to
which the defences generalise also to new, held
out sets of perturbations, we assemble a new, dis-
joint perturbation space of identical size per NE
tag as those used during training, and evaluate
models on attacks with respect to these perturba-
tions. Named entities are chosen from English
Wikipedia using the same method as for the train-
ing perturbation spaces, and chosen such that they
are disjoint from the training perturbation space.
We then execute adversarial attacks using these
new attack spaces on the previously trained mod-
els, and find that both vulnerability rates of the
standard model, as well as relative defence success
transfer to the new attack spaces. For example,
with η = 256 we observe vulnerability ratios of
51.7%, 20.7%, and 23.8% on SQuAD2.0 for stan-
dard training, data augmentation, and adversarial
training, respectively. Detailed results for different
values of η, as well as for NewsQA can be found
in Appendix B.
6.2 Generalisation in a Biased Data Setting
Datasets for high-level NLP tasks often come with
annotation and selection biases; models then learn
to exploit shortcut triggers which are dataset- but
not task-specific (Jia and Liang, 2017; Gururan-
gan et al., 2018). For example, a model might be
confronted with question/paragraph pairs which
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Person Date Numerical
EM F1 EM F1 EM F1
BERT BASE - w/ data bias 55.9 63.1 48.9 58.2 38.7 48.0
+ Robust Training 59.1 66.6 58.4 65.6 48.7 58.9
BERT BASE - w/o data bias 69.2 78.1 73.2 81.7 69.6 80.5
Table 5: Robust training leads to improved generalisation under train/test distribution mismatch (data bias, top).
Bottom: control experiment without train/test mismatch.
only ever contain one type-consistent answer span,
e.g. mention one number in a text with a How
many...? question. It is then sufficient to learn to
pick out numbers from text to solve the task, ir-
respective of other information given in the ques-
tion. Such a model might then have trouble gen-
eralising to articles that mention several numbers,
as it never learned that it is necessary to take into
account other relevant question information that
helps determine the correct answer.
We test models in such a scenario: a model is
trained on SQuAD1.1 questions with paragraphs
containing only a single type-consistent answer
expression for either a person, date, or numeri-
cal answer. At test time, we present it with ques-
tion/article pairs of the same respective question
types, but now there are multiple possible type-
consistent answers in the paragraph. We obtain
such data from Lewis and Fan (2019), who first de-
scribed this biased data scenario. Previous experi-
ments on this dataset were conducted without ded-
icated development set, so while using the same
training data, we split the test set with a 40/60%
split5 into development and test data.6 We then
test both a vanilla fine-tuned BERT BASE trans-
former model, and a model trained to be less vul-
nerable to undersensitivity attacks using data aug-
mentation. Finally, we perform a control exper-
iment, where we join and shuffle all data points
from train/dev/test (of each question type, respec-
tively), and split the dataset into new parts of the
same size as before, which now follow the same
data distribution (w/o data bias setting).
Table 5 shows the results. In this biased
data scenario we observe a marked improvement
across metrics and answer type categories when a
model is trained with unanswerable samples (ro-
bust training). This demonstrates that the negative
5Approximate, as we stratify by article.
6We also include an experiment with the previous data
setup used by Lewis and Fan (2019), see Appendix E.
training signal stemming from related – but unan-
swerable – questions counterbalances the signal
from answerable questions in such a way, that the
model learns to better take into account relevant
information in the question, which allows it to cor-
rectly distinguish among several type-consistent
answer possibilities in the text, which the standard
BERT BASE model does not learn well.
6.3 Evaluation on Adversarial SQuAD
We next evaluated BERT LARGE and BERT
LARGE + Augmentation Training on ADDSENT
and ADDONESENT, which contain adversarially
composed samples (Jia and Liang, 2017). Our
results, summarised in Table 9 in the Appendix,
show that including altered samples during the
training of BERT LARGE improves EM/F1 scores
by 2.7/3.7 and 0.1/1.6 points on the two datasets,
respectively.
6.4 Transferability of Attacks
We train a RoBERTa model (Liu et al., 2019) on
SQuAD2.0, and conduct undersensitivity attacks
(ρ = 6, η = 256). For the same attack budget,
error rates are considerably lower for RoBERTa
(34.5%) than for BERT (54.7%). When consid-
ering only samples where RoBERTa was found
vulnerable, BERT also has a vulnerability rate
of 90.7%. Concrete adversarial inputs x′ chosen
for RoBERTa transfer when evaluating BERT for
17.5% of samples (i.e. satisfy Inequality 2).
7 Conclusion
We have investigated a problematic behaviour of
RC models – being overly stable in their pre-
dictions when given semantically altered ques-
tions. We find that model robustness to under-
sensitivity attacks can be drastically improved us-
ing appropriate defences, such as data augmenta-
tion and adversarial training, without sacrificing
in-distribution test set performance. Future work
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should address in more detail the causes and bet-
ter defences to model undersensitivity, which we
believe can provide an alternative viewpoint on a
model’s RC capabilities.
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SQuAD2.0 Undersensitivity Error Rate
Adv. budget η @32 @64 @128 @256
BERT LARGE 40.7 45.2 48.6 51.7
+ Data Augment. 4.8 7.9 11.9 20.7
+ Adv. Training 9.2 12.2 16.5 23.8
Table 6: Breakdown of undersensitivity error rate on
SQuAD2.0 with a held-out attack space (lower is bet-
ter).
NewsQA Undersensitivity Error Rate
Adv. budget η @32 @64 @128 @256
BERT BASE 32.8 33.9 35.0 36.2
+ Data Augment. 3.9 6.5 11.9 17.5
+ Adv. Training 17.6 20.7 25.4 28.5
Table 7: Breakdown of undersensitivity error rate on
NewsQA with a held-out attack space (lower is better).
A Appendix: PoS Perturbation Details.
We exclude these PoS-tags when computing per-
turbations: ‘IN’, ‘DT’, ‘.’, ‘VBD’, ‘VBZ’, ‘WP’,
‘WRB’, ‘WDT’, ‘CC’, ‘MD’, ‘TO’.
B Appendix: Generalisation to Held-out
Perturbations
Vulnerability results for new, held-out perturba-
tion spaces, disjoint from those used during train-
ing, can be found in Table 6 for SQuAD2.0, and in
Table 7 for NewsQA.
C Appendix: Adversarial Example from
a Question Collection
Searching in a large collection of (mostly unre-
lated) natural language questions, e.g. among all
questions in the SQuAD2.0 training set, yields sev-
eral cases where the prediction of the model in-
creases, compared to the original question, see Ta-
ble 8 for one example. Such cases are however
rare, and we found the yield of this type of search
to be very low.
D Appendix: Attack Examples
Table 10 shows more examples of successful ad-
versarial attacks on SQuAD2.0.
E Appendix: Biased Data Setup
For completeness and direct comparability, we
also include an experiment with the data setup of
Lewis and Fan (2019) (not holding aside a dedi-
cated validation set). Results can be found in Ta-
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Figure 4: Vulnerability to undersensitivity attacks on
NewsQA.
ble 11. We again observe improvements in the bi-
ased data setting. The robust model outperforms
GQA (Lewis and Fan, 2019) in two of the three
subtasks.
F Appendix: Vulnerability Analysis on
NewsQA
Figure 4 depicts the vulnerability of a BERT
LARGE model on NewsQA under attacks using NE
perturbations.
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Given Text [...] The Normans were famed for their martial spirit and eventually for their
Christian piety, becoming exponents of the Catholic orthodoxy [...]
Q (orig) What religion were the Normans? 0.78
Q (adv.) IP and AM are most commonly defined by what type of proof system? 0.84
Table 8: Drastic example for lack of specificity: unrelated questions can trigger the same prediction (here: Catholic
orthodoxy), and with higher probability.
ADDSENT ADDONESENT DEV 2.0
EM F1 EM F1 EM F1
BERT Large 61.3 66.0 70.1 74.9 78.3 81.4
BERT Large+NE defence 64.0 70.3 70.2 76.5 78.9 82.1
Table 9: Comparison between BERT LARGE and BERT LARGE + data augmentation using NE perturbations, on
two sets of adversarial examples: ADDSENT and ADDONESENT from Jia and Liang (2017).
Original / Modified Question Prediction Annotation Scores
What ethnic neighborhood in Fresno Kilbride had Chinatown valid 0.998
primarily Japanese residents in 1940? 0.999
The Mitchell Tower MIT is designed to look Magdalen valid 0.96
like what Oxford tower? Tower 0.97
What does the EU’s legitimacy digimon rest on? the ultimate valid 0.38
authority of [...] 0.40
What is Jacksonville’s hottest recorded 104◦F valid 0.60
temperature atm ? 0.62
Table 10: Example adversarial questions ( original , attack ), together with their annotation as either a valid
counterexample or other type. Top 2: Named entity (NE) perturbations. Bottom 2: PoS perturbations.
Person Date Numerical
EM F1 EM F1 EM F1
GQA (Lewis and Fan, 2019) 53.1 61.9 64.7 72.5 58.5 67.6
BERT BASE - w/ data bias 66.0 72.5 67.1 72.0 46.6 54.5
+ Robust Training 67.4 72.8 68.1 74.4 56.3 64.5
Table 11: Robust training leads to improved generalisation under train/test distribution mismatch (data bias).
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